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Abstract. Fault-tolerant distributed algorithms are central for building
reliable spatially distributed systems. Unfortunately, the lack of a canoni-
cal precise framework for fault-tolerant algorithms is an obstacle for both
verification and deployment. In this paper, we introduce a new domain-
specific framework to capture the behavior of fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms in an adequate and precise way. At the center of our frame-
work is a parameterized system model where control flow automata are
used for process specification. To account for the specific features and
properties of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms for message-passing
systems, our control flow automata are extended to model threshold
guards as well as the inherent non-determinism stemming from asyn-
chronous communication, interleavings of steps, and faulty processes.
We demonstrate the adequacy of our framework in a representative case
study where we formalize a family of well-known fault-tolerant broadcast-
ing algorithms under a variety of failure assumptions. Our case study is
supported by model checking experiments with safety and liveness speci-
fications for a fixed number of processes. In the experiments, we system-
atically varied the assumptions on both the resilience condition and the
failure model. In all cases, our experiments coincided with the theoretical
results predicted in the distributed algorithms literature. This is giving
clear evidence for the adequacy of our model.
In a companion paper [18], we are addressing the new model checking
techniques necessary for parametric verification of the distributed algo-
rithms captured in our framework.
1 Introduction
Even formally verified computer systems are subject to power outages, bad elec-
trical connections, arbitrary bit-flips in memory, etc. A classic approach to ensure
that a computer system is reliable, and continues to perform its task, even if some
components fail, is replication. The idea is to have multiple computers instead
of a single one (that would constitute a single point of failure), and ensure that
the replicated computers coordinate, and for instance in the case of replicated
databases, store the same information. Ensuring that all computers agree on
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the same information is non-trivial due to several sources of non-determinism,
namely, faults, uncertain message delays, and asynchronous computation steps.
To address this important problem, fault-tolerant distributed algorithms were
introduced many years ago. As they are designed to increase the reliability of
systems, it is crucial that they are in fact correct, i.e., that they satisfy their spec-
ifications. Due to the mentioned non-determinism it is however very easy to make
mistakes in the correctness arguments for fault-tolerant distributed algorithms.
The combination of criticality and difficulty make fault-tolerant distributed al-
gorithms a natural candidate for model checking.
Unfortunately, there are three reasons why model checking fault-tolerant dis-
tributed algorithms is a complicated task. (i) First, they are mathematically com-
plex, and inherently contain many sources of non-determinism. (ii) Second, there
is no canonical model, such that each algorithm comes with different — and usu-
ally complex — assumptions about the environment, in particular assumptions
on degrees of concurrency, message delays, and failure models. By failure models
we mean both, the anticipated behavior of faulty components and a resilience
condition stating the fraction of faulty components among all components of the
system. (iii) Finally, distributed algorithms are traditionally described in pseu-
docode. This approach is problematic because every paper comes with a different
(alas unspecified) pseudo code language. It is often not clear how a given pseudo
code is related to the computational model that is provided only in natural lan-
guage. Other authors from formal methods have also argued that the algorithms
and proofs in these papers are hard to understand for outsiders [15].
All these problems result in three verification research problems for the use
of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. Together, they close the methodological
gap between distributed algorithms, verification, and software engineering:
Formalization problem. There is no modeling language for fault tolerant dis-
tributed algorithms, and the pseudocode and hidden assumptions make it
difficult to understand the semantics. Success in this area crucially depends
on collaboration of researchers from model checking and from distributed
algorithms.
Verification problem. Even in the presence of a precise model, there are many
open problems in the area of verification. A central challenge is parameter-
ized model checking, i.e., verification of a given fault-tolerant distributed
algorithm for all system sizes. Note however that verification without ade-
quate formalization is pointless, as one can never be sure what actually has
been verified.
Deployment problem. How can one transfer a formal model to a real-life
implementation and ensure its conformance with the (verified) model?
This paper is devoted to the formalization problem. In a companion pa-
per [18], we are developing new parameterized model checking methods for fault
tolerant distributed algorithms. A central and important goal of our work is
to initiate a systematic study of distributed algorithms from a verification and
programming language point of view in a way that does not betray the fun-
damentals of distributed algorithms. The famous bakery algorithm [20] is the
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most striking example from the literature where wrong specifications have been
verified or wrong semantics have been considered. Many papers in formal meth-
ods have claimed to prove correctness of the bakery algorithm as evidence for
their practical applicability. From a distributed algorithms perspective, however,
most of these papers miss that the algorithm is not using the strong assumption
of atomic registers but requires only safe registers [21]. Although this example
shows that many issues in distributed algorithms are quite subtle, the distributed
algorithm literature is often not very explicit about them, making it hard for
non-experts to extract the correct model.
Reviewing the distributed algorithms literature, the formalization problem
can be reduced to two central questions. (i) First, the question how algorithms
are described, and (ii) second, the question how to capture the vast diversity in
computational models that describe the environment.
(i) Algorithm descriptions in the literature are based on pseudo code, whose
semantics is described in a handwaving manner (if it is described at all): In
particular, details which are considered not interesting for the current distributed
algorithm are ignored or only hinted at, e.g., the bookkeeping over the messages
that have been sent and received so far.
(ii) The example of the bakery algorithm shows that assumptions on computa-
tional models are very subtle. The distributed algorithms literature does, how-
ever, rarely state these assumptions precisely but rather present them in natural
language. This is very unfortunate as there are quite involved assumptions that
are usually not considered in model checking. For instance, [10] postulates that
in each run there is a value Φ such that between two steps of a process, ev-
ery other process takes at most Φ steps. Assumptions of this kind are crucial
for fault-tolerant distributed algorithms because there are impossibility results
for the classic asynchronous interleaving semantics [12]. In other words, without
these assumptions, all algorithms violate the specification. Apart from inter-
leaving of steps, non-trivial assumptions can also be found for message delays,
behavior of faulty processes, behavior of faulty links, and resilience conditions
on the fraction of faulty process.
To address both aspects of the formalization problem, we need a novel frame-
work which is natural and adequate for the distributed algorithms community,
but precise enough to facilitate automated verification. The current paper rep-
resents a first step towards this goal.
Contributions of the current paper. We introduce a new framework for the spec-
ification of distributed algorithms. We focus on the important class of threshold-
guarded fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, which we discuss in detail in Sec-
tion 2. For this class, we introduce a parameterized modeling framework based on
control flow automata, which is a notion from software model checking extended
by non-determinism and threshold guards. Our framework facilitates flexible
fine-grained and adequate description of distributed algorithms under different
fault assumptions and resilience conditions. For automatic treatment, we have
a front-end similar to Promela [17]. With this formalism we can express, e.g.,
several variants of classic asynchronous broadcasting algorithms [32] under differ-
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ent fault assumptions. Our framework is only the first step towards considering
various environments that are different from the asynchronous one, e.g., par-
tial synchrony or round models. This will allow us to express a wider range of
fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, e.g., [10,4,5,14,33].
After introducing the framework, we provide a case study and experiments
that show how to translate distributed algorithms into our framework. We dis-
cuss the formalization of an important family of fault-tolerant distributed al-
gorithms, which is well-understood. In our experiments we consider different
fault models, and systematically validate the adequacy of our modeling frame-
work. The experiments are made for a bounded number of processes, i.e., the
model checking is relatively straight-forward, but not scalable to large numbers
of processes. As we do not need abstractions for this tasks, we avoid simplifica-
tion artefacts. Our experiments show that our modeling framework is adequate.
Thus we have a starting point for a serious investigation of parameterized model
checking and of systematic deployment.
Organization of the paper. We first discuss the standard pseudocode construct of
fault-tolerant distributed algorithms — namely threshold guards — in Section 2.
In Section 3, we introduce a general system model for fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms that provides parameterized processes, parameterized system sizes,
and resilience conditions. Section 4 introduces our novel variant of control flow
automata, and discusses how they can be composed to derive instances of dis-
tributed systems based on the model of Section 3. In Section 5, we describe
the translation of our case study algorithm to its corresponding control flow au-
tomaton. Section 6 presents the outcomes of our model checking experiments,
and Section 7 relates our approach to other existing approaches for specifying
concurrent algorithms.
2 Threshold guarded distributed algorithms
Processes that execute the instances of a distributed algorithm exchange mes-
sages, and the state transitions of these processes are predominantly determined
by the messages received. In addition to the standard execution of actions, which
are guarded by some predicate on the local state, most basic distributed algo-
rithms (cf. [23,1]) just add existentially and/or universally guarded commands
involving received messages:
if received <m>
from some process
then action(m);
(a) existential guard
if received <m>
from all processes
then action(m);
(b) universal guard
Depending on the content of the message <m>, the function action performs
a local state transition and possibly sends messages to one or more processes.
Such constructs can be found, e.g., in (non-fault-tolerant) distributed algorithms
for constructing spanning trees, flooding, or network synchronization [23].
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Understanding and analyzing such distributed algorithms is far from being
trivial, which is due to the uncertainty that local processes have about the state of
other processes. After all, real processors execute at different and varying speeds,
and the end-to-end message delays also vary considerably. Viewed from the global
perspective, this results in considerable non-determinism of the executions of a
distributed system.
Another very important additional source of non-determinism are faults. In
fact, one of the major benefits of using distributed algorithms is their ability
to cope with faults. In case of distributed agreement, for example, it is guaran-
teed that all non-faulty processes compute the same result even if some other
processes fail. Fault-tolerant distributed algorithms hence typically increase the
reliability of distributed systems [29].
In order to shed some light on the difficulties faced by a distributed algo-
rithm in the presence of faults, consider Byzantine faults [27], which allow a
faulty process to behave arbitrarily: Faulty processes may fail to send messages,
send messages with erroneous values, or even send conflicting information to
different processes. In addition, faulty processes may even collaborate in order
to increase their adverse power. In practice, Byzantine faults can be caused by
power outages, bad electrical connections, arbitrary bit-flips in memory, or even
unexpected behavior due to intruders who have taken over control of some part
of the system.
If one used the construct of Example (a) in the presence of Byzantine faults,
the (local state of the) receiver process would be corrupted if the received mes-
sage <m> originates in a faulty process. A faulty process could hence contaminate
a correct process. On the other hand, if one tried to use the construct of Ex-
ample (b), a correct process would wait forever (starve) when a faulty process
omits to send the required message. To overcome those problems, fault-tolerant
distributed algorithms typically require assumptions on the maximum number
of faults, and employ suitable thresholds for the number of messages which can
be expected to be received by correct processes. Assuming that the system con-
sists of n processes among which at most t may be faulty, threshold guarded
commands such as the following are typically used by fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms:
if received <m> from n-t distinct processes
then action(m);
Assuming that thresholds are functions of the parameters n and t, threshold
guards are a just generalization of quantified guards as given in Examples (a)
and (b): In the above command, a process waits to receive n− t messages from
distinct processes. As there are at least n− t correct processes, the guard cannot
be blocked by faulty processes, which avoids the problems of the construct of
Example (b). In the distributed algorithms literature, one finds a variety of
different threshold guarded commands. Another prominent example is t + 1,
which ensures that at least one message comes from a non-faulty process.
5
However, in the setting of Byzantine fault tolerance, it is important to note
that the use of threshold guarded commands implicitly rests on the assumption
that a receiver can distinguish messages from different senders. In practice, this
can be achieved e.g. by using point-to-point links between processes or by mes-
sage authentication. What is important here is that Byzantine faulty processes
are only allowed to exercise control on their own messages and computations,
but not on the messages sent by other processes and the computation of other
processes.
3 Parameterized System Model
We model distributed algorithms via their parameters, the processes, and the
communication medium, the latter via shared variables. In Section 4, we will
introduce a new variant of control flow automata that allows to specify processes
of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. We will discuss how message passing
distributed algorithms (as mentioned in Section 2) can be expressed in such a
model in Section 5.
We shall define the parameters, local variables of the processes, and shared
variables referring to a single domain D that is totally ordered and has the
operations addition and subtraction. In this paper we will assume that D = N0.
We use the standard notion of models denoted by |=.
We start with some notation. Let Y be a finite set of variables ranging over D.
We will denote by D|Y |, the set of all |Y |-tuples of variable values. In order to
simplify notation, given s ∈ D|Y |, we use the expression s.y, to refer to the value
of a variable y ∈ Y in vector s. For two vectors of variable values s and s′, by
s =X s
′ we denote the case where for all x ∈ X, s.x = s′.x holds.
The finite set of variables V = Π ∪ {sv} ∪ Λ ∪ Γ , where the separate sets
are described below. The finite set Π is a set of parameter variables that range
over D, and the resilience condition RC is a predicate over D|Π|. In our example,
Π = {n, t, f}, and the resilience condition RC (n, t, f) is n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t ∧ t >
0. Then, we denote the set of admissible parameters by PRC = {p ∈ D|Π| |
RC(p)}. The variable sv is the status variable that ranges over a finite set SV
of status values. (For simplicity, we assume that only one status variable is used;
however, multiple finite domain status variables can be encoded into sv .) The
finite set Λ contains variables that range over the domain D. The variable sv
and the variables from Λ are local variables. The finite set Γ contains the shared
variables that range over D.
A process operates on states from the set S = SV ×D|Λ|×D|Γ |×D|Π|. Each
process starts its computation in an initial state from a set S0 ⊆ S. A relation
R ⊆ S × S defines transitions from one state to another, with the restriction
that the values of parameters remain unchanged, i.e., for all (s, t) ∈ R, s =Π t.
Then, a parameterized process skeleton is a tuple Sk = (S, S0, R).
We get a process instance by fixing the parameter values p ∈ D|Π|: one can
restrict the set of process states to S|p = {s ∈ S | s =Π p} as well as the set
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of transitions to R|p = R ∩ (S|p × S|p). Then, a process instance is a process
skeleton Sk|p = (S|p, S0|p, R|p) where p is constant.
For fixed admissible parameters p, a distributed system is modeled as an
asynchronous parallel composition of identical processes Sk|p. The number of
processes in this parallel composition depends on the parameters. To formalize
this, we define the size of a system (the number of processes) using a function
N : PRC → N. On our example, we will model only non-faulty processes explic-
itly in our case study, and we will thus use n−f for N(n, t, f) in our case study.
Finally, given p ∈ PRC , and a parameterized process skeleton Sk = (S, S0, R),
we can define a system instance as a Kripke structure. Let AP be a set of atomic
propositions. (The specific atomic propositions and labeling function that we
will consider in this paper will be introduced in Section 4.1.) A system instance
Inst(p,Sk) is a Kripke structure (SInst, S
0
Inst, RInst,AP, λInst) where:
– The set of (global) states is SInst = {(σ[1], . . . , σ[N(p)]) ∈ (S|p)N(p) | ∀i, j ∈
{1, . . . , N(p)}, σ[i] =Γ∪Π σ[j]}. More informally, a global state σ is a Carte-
sian product of the state σ[i] of each process i, where the values of parameters
and shared variables are the same at each process.
– S0Inst = (S
0)N(p) ∩ SInst is the set of initial (global) states, where (S0)N(p) is
the Cartesian product of initial states of individual processes.
– A transition (σ, σ′) from a global state σ ∈ SInst to a global state σ′ ∈ SInst
belongs to RInst iff there is an index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N(p), such that:
(move). The i-th process moves: (σ[i], σ′[i]) ∈ R|p.
(frame). The values of the local variables of the other processes are pre-
served: for every process index j 6= i, 1 ≤ j ≤ N(p), it holds that
σ[j] ={sv}∪Λ σ′[j].
– λInst : SInst → 2AP is a state labeling function.
The set of global states SInst and the transition relation RInst are preserved
under every transposition i↔ j of process indices i and j in {1, . . . , N(p)}. That
is, every system Inst(p,Sk) is fully symmetric by construction.
Temporal Logic. We specify properties of distributed algorithms in formulas of
temporal logic LTL \ X. An formula of LTL \ X is defined inductively as:
– a literal p or ¬p, where p ∈ AP, or
– Fϕ, Gϕ, ϕUψ, ϕ ∨ ψ, and ϕ ∧ ψ, where ϕ and ψ are LTL \ X formulas.
We use the standard definitions of paths and the semantics of the LTL \ X
formulas [6].
Model checking an instance of a parameterized system. Now, we arrive at the
formulation of a parameterized model checking problem. Given:
– a domain D,
– a parameterized process skeleton Sk = (S, S0, R),
– a resilience condition RC on parameters Π (generating a set of admissible
parameters PRC),
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– parameter values p ∈ PRC ,
– and an LTL \ X formula ϕ,
check whether Inst(p,Sk) |= ϕ.
4 A Modeling Framework for Distributed Algorithms
In this section, we adapt the general definitions of the previous section to fault-
tolerant distributed algorithms. First we introduce atomic propositions that al-
low us to express typical specifications of distributed algorithms. Then, we define
our control flow automata (CFA) that are suitable to express threshold guarded
distributed algorithms as parameterized process skeleton.
4.1 Quantified Propositions for Distributed Algorithms
We write specifications for our parameterized systems in LTL \X. This contrasts
the vast majority of work on parameterized model checking where indexed tem-
poral logics are used [3,7,8,11]. The reason for the use of indexed temporal logics
is that they allow to express individual process progress, e.g., in dining philoso-
phers it is required that if a philosopher i is hungry, then i eventually eats.
Intuitively, dining philosophers requires us to trace indexed processes along a
computation, e.g., ∀i. G (hungryi → (F eatingi)).
In contrast, fault-tolerant distributed algorithms are typically used to achieve
certain global properties, as consensus (agreeing on a common value), or broad-
cast (ensuring that all processes deliver the same set of messages). To capture
these kinds of properties, we have to trace only existentially or universally quan-
tified properties, e.g., part of the broadcast specification (relay) [32] states that
if some correct process accepts a message, then all (correct) processes accept the
message, that is, (G (∃i. accepti))→ (F (∀j. acceptj)).
We are therefore considering a temporal logic where the quantification over
processes is restricted to propositional formulas. We will need two kinds of quan-
tified propositional formulas. First, we introduce the set APSV that contains
propositions that capture comparison against some status value Z ∈ SV , i.e.,
[∀i. sv i = Z] and [∃i. sv i = Z] .
This allows us to express specifications of distributed algorithms. To express
the mentioned relay property, we identify the status values where a process has
accepted the message. We may quantify over all processes as we will only model
those processes explicitely that are restricted in their internal behavior, that is,
correct or benign faulty processes. More severe faults (e.g., Byzantine faults) are
modeled via non-determinism. For a detailed discussion see Section 5.
Second, in order to express comparison of variables ranging over D, we add
a set of atomic propositions APD that capture comparison of variables x, y, and
constant c that all range over D; APD consists of propositions of the form
[∃i. xi + c < yi] .
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We then define AP to be the disjoint union of APSV and APD . The labeling
function λInst of a system instance Inst(p,Sk) maps its state σ to expressions p
from AP as follows:
[∀i. sv i = Z] ∈ λInst(σ) iff
∧
1≤i≤N(p)
(σ[i].sv = Z)
[∃i. sv i = Z] ∈ λInst(σ) iff
∨
1≤i≤N(p)
(σ[i].sv = Z)
[∃i. xi + c < yi] ∈ λInst(σ) iff
∨
1≤i≤N(p)
(σ[i].x+ c < σ[i].y)
4.2 CFA for Threshold Guarded Distributed Algorithms
Processes that run distributed algorithms execute the same acyclic piece of code
repeatedly. In the parlance of distributed algorithms, a single execution of this
code is called a step, and steps of correct processes are considered to be atomic.
Depending on the actual code, one can classify distributed algorithms by what
may happen during a step. For instance, in our case study, a step consists of a
receive, a computation, and a sending phase. Therefore, we are led to describe
steps using the concept of control flow automata (CFA), where paths from the
initial to the final location of the CFA describe one step of the distributed
algorithm.
A control flow automata CFA is a link-labeled directed acyclic graph A =
(Q, qI , qF , E) with a finite set Q of nodes, called the locations, an initial location
qI ∈ Q, and a final location qF ∈ Q. A path from qI to qF is used to describe
one step of the distributed algorithm. The edges have the form E ⊆ Q×Op×Q,
where Op is the set of operations whose syntax is defined as:
var ::= 〈name of a variable from Λ ∪ Γ 〉 (1)
sval ::= 〈an element of SV 〉 (2)
param ::= 〈name of a parameter variable from Π〉 (3)
condvar ::= var | ε (4)
lin form ::= param | int | lin form + lin form | lin form− lin form (5)
threshold ::= lin form (6)
guard ::= sv = sval | threshold ≤ var | guard ∧ guard | ¬guard (7)
atomcond ::= condvar ≤ condvar + lin form (8)
cond ::= atomcond | cond ∧ cond (9)
Op ::= sv := sval | inc var | guard | var := ε where cond (10)
In addition to constructs of standard control flow automata, we use the state-
ment “ε where cond” that non-deterministically chooses a value ε that satisfies
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condition “cond,” if such a value exists, otherwise the statement blocks. More-
over, there is a special variable sv ranging over SV . Most importantly, our thresh-
old guarded commands can be expressed as combinations of threshold conditions
via guard.
Operational semantics. To distinguish the notions of states in a process skeleton
and states in a CFA, we call states in a CFA valuations while states in process
skeletons are called states. The set of valuations are defined identically to the set
of states defined in Section 3 as SV ×D|Λ| ×D|Γ | ×D|Π|. Then, the following
shows the semantics where we denote by v |= cond[v′.x/ε] that v models cond
if all occurrences of ε in cond are replaced by v′.x:
(v, v′) ∈ JguardK iff v |= guard ∧ v′ = v (11)
(v, v′) ∈ Jsv := svalK iff v′.sv = sval ∧ v =V \{sv} v′ (12)
(v, v′) ∈ Jinc xK iff v′.x = v.x+ 1 ∧ v =V \{x} v′ (13)
(v, v′) ∈ Jx := ε where condK iff v |= cond[v′.x/ε] ∧ v =V \{x} v′ (14)
In Section 5 we discuss how one can obtain a CFA from a description of
a distributed algorithm based on pseudo code used in the literature. Figure 1
(page 12) provides the CFA that corresponds to the Algorithm 1 we analyze in
our case study.
Obtaining a process skeleton and a system instance from a CFA. Let us assume
that SV , SV 0, Λ, Γ , Π, RC , and N are given. Given a CFA A, we now define
the process skeleton Sk(A) = (S, S0, R) induced by A.
From the used variables and parameters we directly obtain the set S of states.
We assume that all variables that range over D are initialized to 0. From this
and SV 0, we obtain S
0.
It remains to define how the transition relation R is obtained from the seman-
tics. For two relations R1 and R2, we use the notation that R1 ◦ R2 = {(x, z) |
(x, y) ∈ R1 ∧ (y, z) ∈ R2}. Each path in the CFA A from qI to qF induces
a sequence of operations ω = o1, . . . , ok for some k; recall that the steps of a
distributed algorithm are described by an acyclic CFA. Then JωK is defined asJo1K ◦ · · · ◦ JokK, and the transition relation is defined by R = ⋃ω path in AJωK.
We have thus defined the process skeleton Sk(A) induced by CFA A. For a
given p ∈ PRC , a system instance Inst(p,Sk(A)) is then the parallel composition
of N(p) process skeletons Sk(A), as defined in Section 3.
5 Transferring Pseudo-code to our Framework
We analyze Algorithm 1, which is the core of the broadcasting primitive
by Srikanth and Toueg [31]. In this section we first describe the computational
model and Algorithm 1 from a distributed algorithms point of view, and will then
show how to capture the algorithm in our modeling framework.
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Algorithm 1 Core logic of the broadcasting algorithm from [32].
Code for processes i if it is correct:
Variables
1: vi ∈ {false,true}
2: accepti ∈ {false,true} ← false
Rules
3: if vi and not sent 〈echo〉 before then
4: send 〈echo〉 to all;
5: if received 〈echo〉 from at least t + 1 distinct processes
and not sent 〈echo〉 before then
6: send 〈echo〉 to all;
7: if received 〈echo〉 from at least n− t distinct processes then
8: accepti ← true;
Computational model for asynchronous distributed algorithms. We recall the
standard assumptions for asynchronous distributed algorithms. As mentioned in
the introduction, a system consists of n processes out of which at most t may be
faulty. When considering a fixed computation, we denote by f the actual number
of faulty processes. It is assumed that n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t ∧ t > 0. Correct processes
follow the algorithm, in that they take steps that correspond to the algorithm
description. Between every pair of processes, there is a bidirectional link over
which messages are exchanged. A link contains two message buffers, each being
the receive buffer of one of the incident processes.
A step of a correct process is atomic and consists of the following three parts.
First a process receives a possibly empty subset of the messages in its buffer, then
it performs a state transition depending on its current state and the received
messages. Finally, a process may send at most one message to each process, that
is, it puts a message in the buffer of the other processes.
Computations are asynchronous in that the steps can be arbitrarily inter-
leaved, provided that each correct process takes an infinite number of steps.
Moreover, if a message m is put into a process p’s buffer, and p is correct,
then m is eventually included in the set of messages received. This property is
called reliable communication. Faulty processes are not restricted, except that
they have no influence of the buffers of links to which they are not incident. This
property is often called non-masquerading, as a faulty process cannot “pretend”
to be another process.
Specific details of Algorithm 1. The code is typical pseudocode found in the dis-
tributed algorithms literature. The lines 3-8 describe one step of the algorithm.
Receiving messages is implicit and performed before line 3, and the possible
sending of messages is deferred to the end, and is performed after line 8.
We observe that a process always sends to all. Moreover, lines 3-8 only con-
sider messages of type 〈echo〉, while all other messages are ignored. Hence, a
Byzantine faulty process has an impact on correct processes only if they send an
11
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
q6
q7
q8
q9
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt + f
¬(t + 1 ≤ rcvd)
t + 1 ≤ rcvd
sv = V0
¬(sv = V0)
inc nsnt
n− t ≤ rcvd
¬(n− t ≤ rcvd)
sv := SE
sv := AC
qI
q1
q2
q3
q4
sv = V1
¬(sv = V1) inc nsnt
sv := SE
q5
qF
rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt
¬(n− t ≤ rcvd)
n− t ≤ rcvd
sv := AC
Fig. 1: Control flow automaton for the steps of Algorithm 1 on the left. On the
right a CFA for a distributed algorithm tolerating clean crash faults.
〈echo〉 when they should not, or vice versa. Note that faulty processes may behave
two-faced, that is, send messages only to a subset of the correct processes. More-
over, faulty processes may send multiple 〈echo〉 messages to a correct process.
However, from the code we observe that multiple receptions of such messages
do not influence the number of messages received by “distinct” processes due
to non-masquerading. Finally, the condition “not sent 〈echo〉 before” guarantees
that each correct process sends 〈echo〉 at most once.
Our modeling choices. The most immediate choice is that we consider the set
of parameters Π to be {n, t, f} and RC(n, t, f) = n > 3t ∧ f ≤ t ∧ t > 0.
In the pseudo code, the status of a process is only implicitly mentioned. The
relevant information we have to represent in the status variable is (i) the initial
state (ii) whether a process has already sent 〈echo〉 and (iii) whether a process
has set accept to true. Observe that once a process has sent 〈echo〉, its value
of vi does not interfere anymore with the further state transitions. Moreover, a
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process only sets accept to true if it has sent a message (or is about to do so
in the current step). Hence, we define the set SV to be {V0,V1,SE,AC}, where
SV 0 = {V0,V1}. V0 corresponds to the case where initially vi = false, and V1
to the case where initially vi = true. Further, SE means that a process has sent
an 〈echo〉 message but has not set accept to true yet, and AC means that the
process has set accept to true. Having fixed the status values, we can formalize
the specifications we want to verify. They are obtained by the broadcasting
specification parts called unforgeability, correctness, and relay introduced in [32]:
G ([∀i. sv i 6= V1]→ G [∀j. sv j 6= AC]) (U)
G ([∀i. sv i = V1]→ F [∃j. sv j = AC]) (C)
G ([∃i. sv i = AC]→ F [∀j. sv j = AC]) (R)
Note carefully that (U) is a safety specification while (C) and (R) are liveness
specifications.
As the asynchrony of steps is already handled by our parallel composition de-
scribed in Section 3, it remains to describe the semantics of sending and receiving
messages in our system model using control flow automata.
Let us first focus on messages from and to correct processes. As we have
observed that each correct process sends at most one message, and multiple
messages from faulty processes have no influence, it would be sufficient to rep-
resent each buffer by a single variable that represents whether a message of a
certain kind has been put into the buffer. As we have only 〈echo〉 messages sent
by correct processes, it is sufficient to model one variable per buffer. Moreover,
if we only consider the buffers between correct processes, due to the “send to
all” it is sufficient to capture all messages between correct processes in a single
variable. To model this, we introduce the shared variable nsnt .
The reception of messages can then be modeled by a local variable rcvd whose
update depends on the messages sent. In particular, upon a receive, the variable
rcvd can be increased to any value less than or equal to nsnt .
It remains to model faults. As our system model is symmetric by construction,
all processes must be identical processes. This allows at least the two possibilities
to model faults:
– we capture whether a process is correct or faulty as a flag in the status, and
require that in each run f ≤ t processes are faulty. Then we would have to
derive a CFA sub-automaton for faulty processes, and would need additional
variables to capture sent messages by faulty processes.
– we consider the system to consist of correct processes only, let N(n, t, f) =
n− f , and model only the influence of faults, via the messages correct pro-
cesses may receive. This can be done by allowing each correct process to
receive at most f messages more than sent by correct ones, that is that rcvd
can be increased to any value less than or equal to nsnt + f .
Implementing the first option would require more variables, namely, the addi-
tional flag to distinguish correct from faulty processes, and the additional vari-
ables to capture messages by faulty processes. These variables would increase
13
the state space, and would make this option non-practical. Moreover, we would
have to capture the number of faults f , and the corresponding resilience condi-
tion. Therefore, we have implemented the latter approach for our experiments
in Section 6.
Based on this discussion we directly obtain the CFA given in Figure 1 that
describes the steps of Algorithm 1. Note that its structure follows the pseudo
code description of Algorithm 1 very closely.
Verification strategy for liveness. Relevant liveness properties can typically only
be guaranteed if the underlying system ensures some fairness guarantees. In asyn-
chronous distributed systems one assumes for instance communication fairness,
that is, every message sent is eventually received. The statement ∃i. rcvd i <
nsnt i describes a global state where messages are still in transit. It follows that
a formula ψ defined by
FG [∃i. rcvd i < nsnt i] (inequity)
states that the system violates communication fairness. We only require a live-
ness specification ϕ to be satisfied if the system is communication fair. In other
words, ϕ is satisfied or the communication is unfair, that is, ϕ∨ψ. Our approach
is to automatically verify ϕ ∨ ψ.
Along all paths where communication is fair, the value of rcvd i has at least
to reach the value of nsnt i. Since rcvd i can only increase upon a step by i, i is
forced to take steps as long as it has not received messages yet. That is, by this
modeling, communication fairness implies some form of computation fairness.
Modeling other fault scenarios. Fault scenarios other than Byzantine faults can
be modeled by changing the system size, using conditions similar to (inequity),
and slightly changing the CFA. More precisely, by changing the non-deterministic
assignment (the edge leaving qI) that corresponds to receiving messages. For in-
stance, replacing Byzantine by send omission process faults [26] could be modeled
as follows: Faulty processes could be modeled explicitly by setting N(n, t, f) = n.
That at most f processes may fail to send messages, could be modeled by
FG [∃i. rcvd i + f < nsnt i]. Finally, in this fault model processes may receive
all messages sent, that is, rcvd := ε where rcvd ≤ ε ∧ ε ≤ nsnt . By similar
adaptations one models, e.g., corrupted communication (e.g., due to value faulty
links) [30], or hybrid fault models [2] that contain different fault scenarios.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We have extended Spin’s [17] input language Promela to be able to express
our control flow automata that operate on unbounded variables and symbolic
variables to express parameters. Figure 2 provides the central parts of the code
of our case study. For the experiments we have implemented four distributed
algorithms that use threshold guarded commands. They differ in the guarded
commands, and work for different fault assumptions. The following list is ordered
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symbolic int N, T, F;
assume(N > 3 && F >= 0 && T >= 1);
assume(N > 3 * T && F <= T);
atomic ex_acc = some(Proc:pc == AC);
atomic all_acc = all(Proc:pc == AC);
atomic in_transit = some(Proc:nrcvd < nsnt);
active[N - F] proctype Proc() {
byte pc = 0, next_pc = 0;
int nrcvd = 0, next_nrcvd = 0;
[...]
do
:: atomic {
[...]
if
:: next_nrcvd >= N - T ->
next_pc = AC;
:: next_nrcvd < N - T &&
(pc == V1 || next_nrcvd >= T + 1) ->
next_pc = SE;
:: else ->
next_pc = pc;
fi;
/∗ send the echo message ∗/
if
:: (pc == V0 || pc == V1) &&
(next_pc == SE || next_pc == AC) ->
nsnt ++;
:: else;
fi;
[...]
}
od;
}
Fig. 2: Example encoding of the CFA in our Promela extension.
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# parameter values spec valid Time Mem. Stored Transitions Depth
Byz
B1 N=7,T=2,F=2 (U) 3 3.13 sec. 74 MB 193 · 103 1 · 106 229
B2 N=7,T=2,F=2 (C) 3 3.43 sec. 75 MB 207 · 103 2 · 106 229
B3 N=7,T=2,F=2 (R) 3 6.3 sec. 77 MB 290 · 103 3 · 106 229
B4 N=7,T=3,F=2 (U) 3 4.38 sec. 77 MB 265 · 103 2 · 106 233
B5 N=7,T=3,F=2 (C) 3 4.5 sec. 77 MB 271 · 103 2 · 106 233
B6 N=7,T=3,F=2 (R) 7 0.02 sec. 68 MB 1 · 103 13 · 103 210
omit
O1 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 (U) 3 1.43 sec. 69 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
O2 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 (C) 3 1.64 sec. 69 MB 60 · 103 1 · 106 183
O3 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 (R) 3 3.69 sec. 71 MB 92 · 103 2 · 106 183
O4 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 (U) 3 1.39 sec. 69 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
O5 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 (C) 7 1.63 sec. 69 MB 53 · 103 1 · 106 183
O6 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 (R) 7 0.01 sec. 68 MB 17 135 53
symm
S1 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 (U) 3 0.04 sec. 68 MB 3 · 103 23 · 103 121
S2 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 (C) 3 0.03 sec. 68 MB 3 · 103 24 · 103 121
S3 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 (R) 3 0.08 sec. 68 MB 5 · 103 53 · 103 121
S4 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 (U) 3 0.01 sec. 68 MB 66 267 62
S5 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 (C) 7 0.01 sec. 68 MB 62 221 66
S6 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 (R) 3 0.01 sec. 68 MB 62 235 62
clean
C1 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 (U) 3 0.01 sec. 68 MB 668 7 · 103 77
C2 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 (C) 3 0.01 sec. 68 MB 892 8 · 103 81
C3 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 (R) 3 0.02 sec. 68 MB 1 · 103 17 · 103 81
Table 1: Summary of experiments
from the most general fault model to the most restricted one. The given resilience
conditions on n and t are the ones we expected from the literature, and their
tightness was confirmed by our experiments:
Byz. tolerates t Byzantine faults if n > 3t,
symm. tolerates t symmetric (identical Byzantine [1]) faults if n > 2t,
omit. tolerates t send omission faults if n > 2t,
clean. tolerates t clean crash faults for n > t.
The CFAs of these algorithms follow the same principles, so we do not give
all of them in this paper. Figure 1 provides the most complicated one, namely
Byz (we discussed how it is obtained from the literature in detail in Section 5),
next to the CFA of clean which actually is the simplest one. Our tool takes as
input a CFA encoded in extended Promela, and concrete values for parameters,
generates as output standard Promela code.
The major goal of the experiments was to check the adequacy of our for-
malization. To this end we considered the four mentioned well-understood dis-
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tributed algorithms. For each of which we systematically1 changed the parameter
values, in order to ascertain that under our modeling, the different combination
of parameters lead to the expected result. Table 1 and Figures 3, 4 summarize
the results of our experiments.
Lines B1 – B3, O1 – O3, S1 – S3, and C1 – C3 capture the cases that are within
the resilience condition known for the respective algorithm, and the algorithms
were verified by Spin. In Lines B4 – B6, the algorithm’s parameters are chosen
to achieve a goal that is known to be impossible [27], i.e., to tolerate that 3 out
of 7 processes may fail. This violates the n > 3t requirement. Our experiment
shows that even if only 2 faults occur in this setting, the relay specification (R)
is violated. In Lines O4 – O6, the algorithm is designed properly, i.e., 2 out of 5
processes may fail (n > 2t in the case of omission faults). Our experiments show
that this algorithm fails in the presence of 3 faulty processes, i.e., (C) and (R)
are violated.
For slightly bigger systems, that is, for n = 11 our experiments run out of
memory. This shows the need for parameterized verification of these algorithms.
7 Related Work
In the area of verification, the most closest work to ours is [13] which introduces
a framework that targets at parameterized fault-tolerant distributed algorithms.
However, [13] only considers fixed size (and finite) process descriptions which,
consequently, cannot depend on the parameters n, t, and f . This makes it im-
possible for the algorithms to use thresholds for two reasons: (i) With fixed
size variables it is impossible to count messages in a parameterized setting.
(ii) When process descriptions do not refer to parameters, it is impossible to
compare counters against e.g., the parameter t, a standard construction in dis-
tributed algorithms. While [13] contains ideas to model faults, the formalism
does only allow to express very limited fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. For
instance, their verification example considered a broadcasting algorithm in the
case of crash faults, that has a trivial threshold guard, namely where one checks
1 Complete experimental data is given in the appendix.
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whether one message is received. As explained in the introduction, these kinds
of rules are problematic in the presence of more severe fault types as Byzantine
faults. Finally, the experimental data they provide is restricted to reporting that
for f = 17 their algorithm was verified. The algorithm they considered as a case
study works in a very simple setting, namely it is correct for all combinations
of n and t, so they did not have to consider resilience conditions. However, fail-
ure models that are more involved than their crash assumptions typically call
for special constraints on n and t. Moreover, they use a specification of reliable
broadcast which differs from the distributed algorithms literature (e.g., [16]). In
fact, their specification can be satisfied with a trivial algorithm (consisting of a
single assignment Σv := ⊥).
To conclude, [13] considered the very important area of formal verification
of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms, and showed what kind of modeling is
feasible with techniques from regular model checking. From the points discussed
above, it is clear the their approach although making interesting progress falls
short of several aspects of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. An important
goal of our work is to initiate a systematic study of distributed algorithms from
a verification and programming language point of view in a way that does not
betray the fundamentals of distributed algorithms. We believe that ours is indeed
the first paper about model checking of an adequately modeled fault-tolerant
distributed algorithm. In our companion paper [18], we even show how to verify
the algorithms from the experiments above for all system sizes, and we thus
actually verify the algorithms rather than just instances of the algorithms.
The I/O Automata framework [24,19,25] models a distributed system as a
collection of automata representing processes and of automata representing the
communication medium, e.g., message passing links. The framework concentrates
on the interfaces — input and output actions — rather than on semantics, and in
fact much of the IOA literature on distributed algorithms uses pseudo code to
describe what happens, e.g., upon an input event. In contrast to I/O Automata,
which focus on the interfaces between processes (input, output), our CFAs fo-
cus on the semantics for steps of distributed algorithms, and the construction
of a system instance as a Kripke structure corresponds directly to standard dis-
tributed computing models like [12,9,10], that are build around steps rather than
input or output actions.
The temporal logic of actions [22] is a variant of temporal logic by [28], and
built upon it, TLA+ is a specification language for concurrent and reactive sys-
tems. This approach is very general, because one can express a wide variety of
systems in TLA and TLA+. As our domain-specific framework is built specifi-
cally for distributed algorithms, we focused on their specifics such as resilience
conditions, faults, and asynchrony.
8 Conclusions
We introduced a framework to capture threshold-based fault-tolerant distributed
algorithms. The framework consists of a parametric system model and of con-
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trol flow automata, which allows to express the non-determinism typical for dis-
tributed algorithms. We explained in detail how an algorithm from the literature
can be formalized in this framework.
We verified the appropriateness of our modeling by model checking four well-
understood fault-tolerant distributed algorithms for fixed system sizes. This
shows that the framework is a starting point to address many exciting verifi-
cation problems in the area of distributed algorithms. In fact, in a companion
paper [18] is dealing with the parameterized verification problem. There, we are
using the framework to apply several abstraction techniques which allowed us
to verify the four algorithms for all combinations of parameters admitted by the
resilience condition.
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APPENDIX
A Experimental data
This section provides a complete set of experiments. The highlighted lines are
the ones we have chosen for the body of the manuscript.
# param spec valid SpinTime SpinMemory Stored Transitions Depth
1 N=3,T=1,Fs=1,Fp=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 533 3 · 103 89
2 N=3,T=1,Fs=1,Fp=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 578 3 · 103 89
3 N=3,T=1,Fs=1,Fp=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 826 6 · 103 89
4 N=5,T=1,Fp=0,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.6 sec. 69.191 MB 39 · 103 375 · 103 177
5 N=5,T=1,Fp=0,Fs=0 corr 3 0.62 sec. 69.191 MB 39 · 103 379 · 103 177
6 N=5,T=1,Fp=0,Fs=0 relay 3 1.56 sec. 70.363 MB 70 · 103 976 · 103 177
7 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.04 sec. 68.019 MB 3 · 103 23 · 103 121
8 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 corr 3 0.03 sec. 68.019 MB 3 · 103 24 · 103 121
9 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=0 relay 3 0.08 sec. 68.019 MB 5 · 103 53 · 103 121
10 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.06 sec. 68.215 MB 5 · 103 45 · 103 139
11 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=1 corr 3 0.06 sec. 68.215 MB 6 · 103 45 · 103 139
12 N=5,T=1,Fp=1,Fs=1 relay 3 0.16 sec. 68.215 MB 10 · 103 111 · 103 139
13 N=5,T=2,Fp=0,Fs=0 unforg 3 1.04 sec. 69.777 MB 53 · 103 515 · 103 188
14 N=5,T=2,Fp=0,Fs=0 corr 3 0.89 sec. 69.777 MB 55 · 103 533 · 103 188
15 N=5,T=2,Fp=0,Fs=0 relay 3 1.81 sec. 70.754 MB 83 · 103 1 · 106 188
16 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.04 sec. 68.019 MB 3 · 103 29 · 103 131
17 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=0 corr 3 0.05 sec. 68.019 MB 4 · 103 33 · 103 131
18 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=0 relay 3 0.08 sec. 68.019 MB 5 · 103 49 · 103 131
19 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.09 sec. 68.215 MB 7 · 103 61 · 103 149
20 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=1 corr 3 0.09 sec. 68.215 MB 8 · 103 62 · 103 149
21 N=5,T=2,Fp=1,Fs=1 relay 3 0.18 sec. 68.41 MB 12 · 103 125 · 103 149
22 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 323 1 · 103 86
23 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 412 2 · 103 86
24 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 359 2 · 103 88
25 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 662 3 · 103 98
26 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 762 4 · 103 98
27 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 856 6 · 103 98
28 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 6 · 103 110
29 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 6 · 103 110
30 N=5,T=2,Fp=2,Fs=2 relay 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 11 · 103 110
31 N=5,T=3,Fp=0,Fs=0 unforg 3 1.01 sec. 70.168 MB 63 · 103 615 · 103 199
32 N=5,T=3,Fp=0,Fs=0 corr 3 1.16 sec. 70.363 MB 69 · 103 670 · 103 199
33 N=5,T=3,Fp=0,Fs=0 relay 3 1.61 sec. 70.754 MB 81 · 103 967 · 103 199
34 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.05 sec. 68.019 MB 4 · 103 31 · 103 141
35 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=0 corr 3 0.06 sec. 68.019 MB 4 · 103 40 · 103 141
36 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=0 relay 3 0.06 sec. 68.019 MB 4 · 103 37 · 103 143
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37 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.11 sec. 68.215 MB 9 · 103 73 · 103 159
38 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=1 corr 3 0.12 sec. 68.215 MB 10 · 103 77 · 103 159
39 N=5,T=3,Fp=1,Fs=1 relay 3 0.17 sec. 68.41 MB 12 · 103 112 · 103 159
40 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 323 1 · 103 90
41 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=0 corr 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 296 1 · 103 94
42 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 322 1 · 103 90
43 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 710 4 · 103 107
44 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 871 4 · 103 107
45 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 763 4 · 103 109
46 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 7 · 103 119
47 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 7 · 103 119
48 N=5,T=3,Fp=2,Fs=2 relay 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 10 · 103 119
49 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 35 135 48
50 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=0 corr 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 35 120 52
51 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 34 127 48
52 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 66 267 62
53 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 corr 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 62 221 66
54 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 62 235 62
55 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 107 447 73
56 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 130 465 73
57 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=2 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 107 439 75
58 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=3 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 148 635 79
59 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=3 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 166 597 79
60 N=5,T=3,Fp=3,Fs=3 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 163 727 79
61 N=11,T=5,Fs=5,Fp=0 unforg OOM 3.45e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 1.3010617e+09 1 · 103
62 N=11,T=5,Fs=5,Fp=0 corr OOM 3.46e+03 sec. 3015.816 MB 59 · 106 1.3011555e+09 1 · 103
63 N=11,T=5,Fs=5,Fp=0 relay OOM 2.88e+03 sec. 3015.816 MB 59 · 106 1.1038422e+09 1 · 103
Table 2: Symm
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# param spec valid SpinTime SpinMemory Stored Transitions Depth
1 N=2,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 72 533 46
2 N=2,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 131 863 50
3 N=2,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 114 1 · 103 50
4 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=0,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 578 5 · 103 83
5 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=0,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 759 7 · 103 83
6 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=0,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 829 11 · 103 83
7 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 578 5 · 103 83
8 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 759 7 · 103 83
9 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 829 11 · 103 83
10 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 249 2 · 103 84
11 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 424 4 · 103 76
12 N=3,Tc=1,Fc=1,Fnc=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 332 4 · 103 77
13 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=0,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 668 7 · 103 77
14 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=0,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 892 8 · 103 81
15 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=0,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 17 · 103 81
16 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 668 7 · 103 77
17 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 892 8 · 103 81
18 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 17 · 103 81
19 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 279 2 · 103 77
20 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 425 4 · 103 78
21 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=1,Fnc=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 475 6 · 103 78
22 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 668 7 · 103 77
23 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 892 8 · 103 81
24 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 17 · 103 81
25 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 279 2 · 103 77
26 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 425 4 · 103 78
27 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 475 6 · 103 78
28 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 133 1 · 103 72
29 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 216 2 · 103 71
30 N=3,Tc=2,Fc=2,Fnc=2 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 198 2 · 103 72
31 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=0,Fnc=0 unforg 7 0.03 sec. 68.019 MB 561 6 · 103 78
32 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=0,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 12 · 103 76
33 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=0,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.04 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 29 · 103 76
34 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=0 unforg 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 561 6 · 103 78
35 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 12 · 103 76
36 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.04 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 29 · 103 76
37 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 529 5 · 103 69
38 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 768 7 · 103 73
39 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=1,Fnc=1 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 92 1 · 103 54
40 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=0 unforg 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 561 6 · 103 78
41 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 12 · 103 76
42 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.04 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 29 · 103 76
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Fig. 5: Spin running time on byz.
 64
 12
8
 25
6
 51
2
 10
24
 20
48
 40
96
4,1 4,2 4,3 5,1 5,2 5,3 6,1 6,2 6,3 7,1 7,2 7,3 8,1 8,2 8,3 9,1
log
2(m
em
ory
)
parameters n, t
unforg, f=0
unforg, f=1
unforg, f=2
unforg, f=3
corr, f=0
corr, f=1
corr, f=2
corr, f=3
relay, f=0
relay, f=1
relay, f=2
relay, f=3
Fig. 6: Spin memory usage on byz.
43 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 529 5 · 103 69
44 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 768 7 · 103 73
45 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=1 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 92 1 · 103 54
46 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 275 2 · 103 66
47 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 446 5 · 103 70
48 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=2,Fnc=2 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 12 86 31
49 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=0 unforg 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 561 6 · 103 78
50 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=0 corr 3 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 12 · 103 76
51 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=0 relay 3 0.03 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 29 · 103 76
52 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 529 5 · 103 69
53 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 768 7 · 103 73
54 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=1 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 92 1 · 103 54
55 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=2 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 275 2 · 103 66
56 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=2 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 446 5 · 103 70
57 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=2 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 12 86 31
58 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=3 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 238 2 · 103 49
59 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=3 corr 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 249 3 · 103 53
60 N=3,Tc=3,Fc=3,Fnc=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 12 86 31
61 N=11,Tc=10,Fc=10,Fnc=0 unforg OOM 6.75e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 2.6021236e+09 757
62 N=11,Tc=10,Fc=10,Fnc=0 corr OOM 6.67e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 2.6021237e+09 761
63 N=11,Tc=10,Fc=10,Fnc=0 relay OOM 6.72e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 2.6055872e+09 761
Table 3: Clean
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# param spec valid SpinTime SpinMemory Stored Transitions Depth
1 N=4,T=1,F=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 533 3 · 103 82
2 N=4,T=1,F=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 639 3 · 103 82
3 N=4,T=1,F=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 706 5 · 103 82
4 N=7,T=1,F=0 unforg 3 278 sec. 458.254 MB 10 · 106 1.4322797e+08 319
5 N=7,T=1,F=0 corr 3 325 sec. 513.332 MB 11 · 106 1.6546415e+08 319
6 N=7,T=1,F=0 relay 3 485 sec. 603.371 MB 14 · 106 2.4976492e+08 319
7 N=7,T=1,F=1 unforg 3 26 sec. 114.504 MB 1 · 106 14 · 106 268
8 N=7,T=1,F=1 corr 3 31.2 sec. 122.121 MB 1 · 106 17 · 106 268
9 N=7,T=1,F=1 relay 3 44.7 sec. 130.91 MB 1 · 106 25 · 106 268
10 N=7,T=1,F=2 unforg 7 1.21 sec. 70.558 MB 74 · 103 748 · 103 241
11 N=7,T=1,F=2 corr 7 2.08 sec. 72.316 MB 127 · 103 1 · 106 225
12 N=7,T=1,F=2 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 42 196 222
13 N=7,T=1,F=3 unforg 7 0.09 sec. 68.215 MB 7 · 103 63 · 103 201
14 N=7,T=1,F=3 corr 7 0.16 sec. 68.41 MB 13 · 103 107 · 103 181
15 N=7,T=1,F=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 35 127 182
16 N=7,T=2,F=0 unforg 3 416 sec. 643.215 MB 15 · 106 2.111452e+08 325
17 N=7,T=2,F=0 corr 3 435 sec. 665.48 MB 15 · 106 2.1891381e+08 325
18 N=7,T=2,F=0 relay 3 859 sec. 949.66 MB 23 · 106 4.3596991e+08 325
19 N=7,T=2,F=1 unforg 3 38.1 sec. 135.597 MB 1 · 106 21 · 106 273
20 N=7,T=2,F=1 corr 3 40.3 sec. 139.113 MB 1 · 106 22 · 106 273
21 N=7,T=2,F=1 relay 3 77.9 sec. 170.363 MB 2 · 106 43 · 106 273
22 N=7,T=2,F=2 unforg 3 3.13 sec. 74.66 MB 193 · 103 1 · 106 229
23 N=7,T=2,F=2 corr 3 3.43 sec. 75.051 MB 207 · 103 2 · 106 229
24 N=7,T=2,F=2 relay 3 6.3 sec. 77.98 MB 290 · 103 3 · 106 229
25 N=7,T=2,F=3 unforg 7 0.11 sec. 68.215 MB 7 · 103 60 · 103 205
26 N=7,T=2,F=3 corr 7 0.21 sec. 68.605 MB 18 · 103 143 · 103 185
27 N=7,T=2,F=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 33 119 176
28 N=7,T=3,F=0 unforg 3 596 sec. 876.418 MB 21 · 106 2.967337e+08 331
29 N=7,T=3,F=0 corr 3 604 sec. 883.449 MB 21 · 106 2.9891686e+08 331
30 N=7,T=3,F=0 relay 3 1.43e+03 sec. 1678.902 MB 35 · 106 7.09111e+08 331
31 N=7,T=3,F=1 unforg 3 55.5 sec. 162.551 MB 2 · 106 29 · 106 278
32 N=7,T=3,F=1 corr 3 56 sec. 163.722 MB 2 · 106 30 · 106 278
33 N=7,T=3,F=1 relay 7 0.83 sec. 68.996 MB 29 · 103 461 · 103 278
34 N=7,T=3,F=2 unforg 3 4.38 sec. 77.004 MB 265 · 103 2 · 106 233
35 N=7,T=3,F=2 corr 3 4.5 sec. 77.199 MB 271 · 103 2 · 106 233
36 N=7,T=3,F=2 relay 7 0.02 sec. 68.019 MB 1 · 103 13 · 103 210
37 N=7,T=3,F=3 unforg 3 0.32 sec. 68.801 MB 25 · 103 209 · 103 188
38 N=7,T=3,F=3 corr 3 0.33 sec. 68.801 MB 26 · 103 215 · 103 188
39 N=7,T=3,F=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 100 528 165
40 N=10,T=3,F=3 unforg OOM 2.02e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 70 · 106 9.9379608e+08 452
41 N=10,T=3,F=3 corr OOM 2.12e+03 sec. 3015.816 MB 70 · 106 9.9381042e+08 452
42 N=10,T=3,F=3 relay OOM 2.97e+03 sec. 3015.816 MB 70 · 106 1.4335274e+09 452
Table 4: Byz
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# param spec valid SpinTime SpinMemory Stored Transitions Depth
1 N=3,To=1,Fo=1 unforg 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 440 4 · 103 77
2 N=3,To=1,Fo=1 corr 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 691 7 · 103 85
3 N=3,To=1,Fo=1 relay 3 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 731 10 · 103 85
4 N=5,To=1,Fo=0 unforg 3 1.46 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
5 N=5,To=1,Fo=0 corr 3 1.41 sec. 69.777 MB 52 · 103 891 · 103 179
6 N=5,To=1,Fo=0 relay 3 3.85 sec. 71.144 MB 96 · 103 2 · 106 179
7 N=5,To=1,Fo=1 unforg 3 1.38 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
8 N=5,To=1,Fo=1 corr 3 1.42 sec. 69.777 MB 53 · 103 909 · 103 183
9 N=5,To=1,Fo=1 relay 3 3.86 sec. 71.34 MB 97 · 103 2 · 106 183
10 N=5,To=1,Fo=2 unforg 3 1.38 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
11 N=5,To=1,Fo=2 corr 3 1.54 sec. 69.777 MB 56 · 103 979 · 103 183
12 N=5,To=1,Fo=2 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 15 131 42
13 N=5,To=1,Fo=3 unforg 3 1.39 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
14 N=5,To=1,Fo=3 corr 3 1.88 sec. 70.168 MB 62 · 103 1 · 106 183
15 N=5,To=1,Fo=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 15 131 42
16 N=5,To=2,Fo=0 unforg 3 1.37 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
17 N=5,To=2,Fo=0 corr 3 1.49 sec. 69.972 MB 57 · 103 945 · 103 179
18 N=5,To=2,Fo=0 relay 3 3.56 sec. 70.949 MB 88 · 103 2 · 106 179
19 N=5,To=2,Fo=1 unforg 3 1.38 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
20 N=5,To=2,Fo=1 corr 3 1.51 sec. 69.972 MB 58 · 103 963 · 103 183
21 N=5,To=2,Fo=1 relay 3 3.53 sec. 70.949 MB 89 · 103 2 · 106 183
22 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 unforg 3 1.43 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
23 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 corr 3 1.64 sec. 69.972 MB 60 · 103 1 · 106 183
24 N=5,To=2,Fo=2 relay 3 3.69 sec. 71.144 MB 92 · 103 2 · 106 183
25 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 unforg 3 1.39 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
26 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 corr 7 1.63 sec. 69.777 MB 53 · 103 1 · 106 183
27 N=5,To=2,Fo=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 17 135 53
28 N=5,To=3,Fo=0 unforg 3 1.41 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
29 N=5,To=3,Fo=0 corr 3 1.8 sec. 70.363 MB 69 · 103 1 · 106 179
30 N=5,To=3,Fo=0 relay 3 2.9 sec. 70.558 MB 75 · 103 1 · 106 179
31 N=5,To=3,Fo=1 unforg 3 1.39 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
32 N=5,To=3,Fo=1 corr 3 1.83 sec. 70.363 MB 70 · 103 1 · 106 183
33 N=5,To=3,Fo=1 relay 3 2.89 sec. 70.558 MB 76 · 103 1 · 106 183
34 N=5,To=3,Fo=2 unforg 3 1.4 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
35 N=5,To=3,Fo=2 corr 7 1.37 sec. 69.582 MB 47 · 103 851 · 103 183
36 N=5,To=3,Fo=2 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 38 257 171
37 N=5,To=3,Fo=3 unforg 3 1.39 sec. 69.582 MB 51 · 103 878 · 103 175
38 N=5,To=3,Fo=3 corr 7 1.65 sec. 69.777 MB 53 · 103 1 · 106 183
39 N=5,To=3,Fo=3 relay 7 0.01 sec. 68.019 MB 38 257 171
40 N=11,To=5,Fo=5 unforg OOM 6.97e+03 sec. 2757.347 MB 59 · 106 2.60E+009 757
41 N=11,To=5,Fo=5 corr OOM 7.25e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 2.7891908e+09 765
42 N=11,To=5,Fo=5 relay OOM 9.82e+03 sec. 3015.621 MB 59 · 106 3.7808961e+09 765
Table 5: Omit
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